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Abstract
Structural unemployment is due to mismatch between available jobs and workers.
We formalize this concept in a simple model of a segmented labor market with search
frictions within segments. Worker mobility, job mobility and wage bargaining costs
across segments generate structural unemployment. We estimate the contribution of
these costs to ‡uctuations in US unemployment, operationalizing segments as states
or industries. Most structural unemployment is due to wage bargaining costs, which
are large but nevertheless contribute little to unemployment ‡uctuations. Structural
unemployment is as cyclical as overall unemployment and no more persistent, both
in the current and in previous recessions.
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11 Introduction
Is unemployment in the Great Recession di¤erent from previous recessions? Narayana
Kocherlakota (2010), president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, argues it
is. In particular, according to Kocherlakota, the dramatic increase in unemployment in
2008 and 2009 was not due to weak aggregate labor market conditions, but to ‘structural’
problems, which generate mismatch between available jobs and workers:
“Firms have jobs, but can’t …nd appropriate workers. The workers want to work,
but can’t …nd appropriate jobs. There are many possible sources of mismatch -
geography, skills, demography- and they are probably all at work.”
Other authors agree, pointing speci…cally to declining geographic mobility as a source
of mismatch (Frey (2009), Katz (2010)).
If the increase in unemployment is structural, then policies like job search assistance
or sectoral employment programs (Katz (2010)) may be more e¤ective than stabilization
policy in bringing down the unemployment rate.
“Whatever the source, though, it is hard to see how the Fed can do much to cure
this problem. Monetary stimulus has provided conditions so that manufacturing
plants want to hire new workers. But the Fed does not have a means to transform
construction workers into manufacturing workers.” (Kocherlakota (2010))
In addition, we might expect the increased unemployment rate to prove more persistent
than in previous recessions.
“Given the structural problems in the labor market, I do not expect unemployment
to decline rapidly.” (Kocherlakota (2010))
Shortly after the 2001 recession, Groshen and Potter (2003) made a similar argument
that misallocation of workers over industries might explain the so called jobless recov-
eries.
Although aggregate data on unemployment and vacancies seem to indicate a decline
in matching e¢ciency (Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2010), Barnichon and Figura (2010)),
there is little direct evidence for mismatch on the US labor market using disaggregated
data. As a result, Kocherlakota’s claim that unemployment in the Great Recession is
structural rather than cyclical, and in particular its implication that stabilization policy
is unlikely to be e¤ective, has been heavily criticized (Krugman (2010), DeLong (2010)).
In this paper, we formalize how mismatch generates unemployment in a simple
model. Then, we estimate structural unemployment on the US labor market. In our
model, the labor market consists of multiple submarkets or segments. Within each seg-
ment, search frictions prevent the instantaneous matching of unemployed workers to
2vacant jobs, resulting in frictional unemployment in the tradition of Diamond (1982),
Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985). In addition, various adjustment costs lead to
dispersion in job …nding rates across submarkets, generating additional unemployment,
which we call structural.
The level of disaggregation of submarkets is crucial for our exercise. In the limiting
case, if submarkets are su¢ciently small such that each unemployed worker and each
vacancy is in a separate submarket, all unemployment is ‘structural’ and due to mis-
match. In fact, one way to think about mismatch in the sense of Shimer (2007a), is as
a possible micro-foundation for search frictions. Here, we think of search frictions and
mismatch as alternative sources of unemployment and explore their di¤erences. Driven
by data limitations, we de…ne submarkets of the US labor market either as states or
as industries, similar to other papers in the empirical literature on mismatch (Sahin,
Song, Topa, and Violante (2010), Barnichon and Figura (2011)). Since the amount of
structural unemployment is very sensitive to the level of disaggregation, we focus on its
cyclical behavior.
There are four sources of structural unemployment in the model. Each segment of
the labor market is characterized by four variables: the job …nding rate, which measures
how hard it is for workers to …nd a job; the worker …nding rate, which measures how hard
it is for …rms to …nd a worker; workers’ surplus from having a job over being unemployed;
and …rms’ surplus of having a …lled position over a vacancy. In the absence of adjustment
costs, worker mobility, job mobility and wage adjustment lead to equalization of labor
market conditions across segments. Figure 1 summarizes these relations. Worker and job
mobility costs, wage bargaining costs and heterogeneity in matching e¢ciency generate
dispersion in labor market conditions and therefore structural unemployment.
In order to estimate structural unemployment and its sources, we need data on
job and worker …nding rates and worker and job surplus by states and industries. We
construct these variables using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). One major issue is that in our model
all workers are assumed to be identical. Because this is obviously not the case in the
real world, we need to control for worker and job heterogeneity when constructing our
estimates. We control for observable worker characteristics and for unobservable but
time-invariant worker and job characteristics (compensating di¤erentials) by allowing
for state and industry-speci…c …xed e¤ects.
We …nd four main results: (1) adjustment costs between states and industries are
large; (2) nevertheless, the contribution of mismatch across industries to unemployment
‡uctuations is modest, and the contribution of mismatch across states is very small, and
there are no striking di¤erences between the Great Recession and previous recessions;
(3) the cyclical behavior and persistence of structural unemployment are similar to
that of the overall unemployment rate; and (4) the most important source of structural
3unemployment is not worker or job mobility costs, but wage bargaining costs. Result
3 casts doubt on the claim that stabilization policy is not e¤ective in curing structural
unemployment, as argued by Kocherlakota (2010). Results 2 and 4 suggest that policies
aimed at increasing worker mobility, as advocated by Katz (2010), are likely to have
small e¤ects. We now discuss each of these results in more detail.
Adjustment costs between states and industries are large. We …nd that workers
are not willing to move between states unless the value of a job in the new state is at
least 15% higher than in her current state. Similarly, …rms are not willing to move jobs
from one state to another unless that move increases pro…ts by at least 18%. Wages
are adjusted to better re‡ect labor market conditions in the state only if wages deviate
as much as 33% from those in other states. Retraining a worker to work in a di¤erent
industry and adjusting industry-level wages is even more costly, and requires an increase
in wages of at least 31% and 61% respectively. Therefore, large dispersion in labor
market conditions can exist without being arbitraged away.
Nevertheless, the contribution of these adjustment costs to ‡uctuations in unem-
ployment is small. Mismatch across states contributes at most about 0:1%-points to
the 5%-point increase in unemployment in the Great Recession, a contribution of no
more than 2%. Mismatch across industries is even less important, with a contribution
of 0:03%-points or 0:6%.1 More importantly, these numbers are very similar for the 1982
and 1991 recessions, suggesting the Great Recession is no di¤erent from previous reces-
sions (instead, the 2001 recession, when geographic mismatch did not increase, looks
like the exception). Results 1 and 2 are not in contradiction with each other, because
the concavity of the job …nding rate in labor market tightness is such that even large
dispersion in job …nding rates translates into modest reductions in the aggregate job
…nding rates, and because the various adjustment costs partially o¤set each other. To
see this last point, imagine two states with a large di¤erence in wages, which is not being
arbitraged away due to wage bargaining costs. If we reduce worker and job mobility
costs, leaving the wage bargaining costs in place, workers will move into and job out of
the high wage state, increasing mismatch and structural unemployment.
Fluctuations in structural unemployment look very similar to ‡uctuations in the
overall unemployment rate. Dispersion in labor market conditions across states and
industries, and therefore structural unemployment, increases in recessions and falls in
booms.2 There is no evidence that structural unemployment is more persistent than
the overall unemployment rate. This …nding suggests that there may not be any con-
ceptual di¤erence between ‘structural’ unemployment and frictional unemployment in
1However, our estimate for the contribution of mismatch across industries is less robust and may be
as high as 0:2%-points or 4% if we do not control for compensating di¤erentials.
2This …nding is similar to that of Abraham and Katz (1986). In response to the structural shifts
view of recessions put forward by Lilien (1982), which holds that recessions are periods of reallocation
between industries akin to mismatch, Abraham and Katz show that aggregate shocks can give rise to
countercyclical ‡uctuations in dispersion of employment growth across sectors.
4the tradition of Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985), and perhaps
a better way to link the two concepts is to think of the aggregate matching function as
re‡ecting underlying heterogeneity and mismatch (Pissarides (2000), Shimer (2007a)).
In particular, since structural unemployment is as cyclical as the overall unemployment
rate, there seems no reason to believe that stabilization policy would be any less e¤ective
in curing it.
The main source of structural unemployment is not mobility barriers for either work-
ers or jobs, but wage bargaining costs. This result is driven by our …nding that states
and industries with high worker suplus (wages) tend to have low job surplus (pro…ts).
This observation is inconsistent with Nash bargaining over wages and di¤erences across
states and industries being driven by di¤erences in total match surplus (labor productiv-
ity). It seems that wages are not only rigid in response to changes in labor productivity,
but there are changes in wages that are unrelated to changes in productivity. An ex-
ogenous increase in wages increases worker surplus but decreases job surplus, consistent
with the data. Wage bargaining costs prevent these wage di¤erentials across states and
industries to be arbitraged away. This generates unemployment as unemployed workers
move into, and vacancies out of high wage states. Policies aimed at reducing worker and
job mobility costs are unlikely to cure this type of structural unemployment, and may
even make it worse.
Empirical studies on structural unemployment tend to focus on shifts in the Bev-
eridge curve, trying to use aggregate data to estimate matching e¢ciency (Lipsey (1965),
Abraham (1987), Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Barnichon and Figura (2010)) and
there is little recent empirical work on mismatch using disaggregated data.3 Two recent
contributions are closely related to this paper. Sahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2010)
use disaggregated data on unemployment and vacancies to construct indices of struc-
tural unemployment, using data from the JOLTS for the 2001-2010 period. Barnichon
and Figura (2011) use the CPS to explore how much dispersion in labor market condi-
tions contributes to movements in matching e¢ciency. Our …ndings are consistent with
these papers in terms of the contribution of mismatch across states and industries to
the increase in unemployment in the Great Recession. The extremely small contribution
of mismatch across states is also consistent with work by Kaplan and SchulhoferWohl
(2010), who show that most of the a drop in interstate migration in the Great Recession
is a statistical artifact. Compared to Sahin et al., we provide an alternative method to
estimate structural unemployment, which gives us a much longer time series. Compared
to Barnichon and Figura, our focus is on unemployment rather than matching e¢ciency.
We contribute to the results in both papers by providing a theory for the sources of dis-
persion in labor market conditions, and by estimating the contribution of each of these
sources to structural unemployment.
3Older studies include work by Padoa Schioppa (1991) and Phelps (1994).
5This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a theoretical
framework to formalize how mismatch across submarkets of the labor market can lead
to structural unemployment. We identify four sources of structural unemployment, three
of which we can estimate: worker mobility costs, job mobility costs and wage bargaining
costs. Section 3 describes the data used in the estmation, and explains in detail how we
construct the empirical counterparts of the variables that de…ne a labor market segment
in our model. Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework presented here allows us to formalize the mechanisms, by
which heterogeneity in labor market conditions across submarkets of the labor market
leads to structural unemployment. In addition, we use the model to guide the empirical
exercise how to estimate structural unemployment and how to decompose it into its
sources. We try to make as little assumptions as possible. In particular, we will not
assume anything about vacancy creation, but only model the distribution of vacancies
and unemployed workers over submarkets.
2.1 Segmented Labor Market
Unemployed workers look for jobs, and …rms with vacancies look for unemployed workers
on the labor market. But not each unemployed worker can match with each vacancy.
We model this by thinking of the labor market as being segmented into submarkets.
A submarket is de…ned as the subset of jobs that a given unemployed worker searches
for, or the subset of unemployed workers that can form a match with a given vacancy.
We assume that there is a one-to-one mapping of the set of workers and …rms that
search for each other, ruling out that workers or …rms spread out their search e¤ort over
several submarkets.4 In addition, we assume that in each submarket, there is a matching
technology with increasing and diminishing returns to each of its inputs: unemployed
workers and vacancies.
Under these assumptions, labor market conditions in a submarket can be completely
characterized by four variables: the probability that an unemployed workers …nds a job,
the increase in life-time earnings by a worker who …nds a job, the probability that a
vacant job …nds a worker, and the increase in life-time pro…ts by a …rm that …lls a
vacant job. These four variables are the job …nding rate pi, worker surplus SW
i , the
worker …nding rate qi and job surplus SJ
i in submarket i respectively.
4Of course, there is a huge empirical problem how to operationalize this concept of a submarket.
Following the literature, we use either states or industries, but a better de…nition is probably skill-based
occupations. Therefore, the real assumption we are making is that workers and …rms can only search in
one state or industry.
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market conditions are related across submarkets. We show which relations e¤ectively
reduce the segmented labor market to a single market, as in the standard search and
matching model with homogeneous workers and jobs, in the tradition of Diamond (1982),
Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985). We take these relations as a starting point and
explore the e¤ect of deviations from these relations. Unemployment that results under
the benchmark model is frictional unemployment, whereas unemployment that results
from deviations from this model is called structural.
The relation between the job …nding rate pi and worker surplus SW
i across sub-
markets is determined by assumptions about worker mobility between submarkets, the
relation between the worker …nding rate qi and job surplus SJ
i by assumptions about
job mobility (mobility of vacancies), the relation between worker and job surplus by
assumptions about wage bargaining, and the relation between job and workers …nding
rates by assumptions about the matching process. These four relations, which are sum-
marized in Figure 1, fully determine conditions in submarkets of the labor market. We
now discuss each of these four relations in turn.
2.1.1 Worker Mobility
An unemployed worker, searching for a job in submarket i, receives an unemployment
bene…t bi (which, as usual, includes the utility from leisure). With probability pi, this
worker …nds a job, in which case she receives the worker surplus SW
i from the match.




If workers may freely decide in which submarket to search, i.e. if there are no barriers
to worker mobility, it must be that the value of searching is equalized across submarkets,
so that zW
i = ￿ zW for all i. Using a bar over a variable to denote its average over all
submarkets and a hat to denote relative deviations from this average, e.g. ^ pi =
pi￿￿ p
￿ p ,
equalization of the value of searching in all submarkets implies the following relation
between ^ pi and ^ SW
i , which we label the worker mobility curve.
^ pi + ^ SW
i = ￿
￿ b
￿ zW ￿￿ b
^ bi (1)
Assuming unemployment bene…ts are the same in all submarkets, we get ^ pi = ￿^ SW
i .
This relation states that attractive jobs must be hard, and unattractive jobs easy to
…nd, in order for workers to be indi¤erent which job they search for. If unemployment
bene…ts di¤er across submarkets, then submarkets with high unemployment bene…ts
must have low job …nding rates or low worker surplus or both.
If there are barriers to worker mobility, for example because it is costly to move
from one state to another, or because moving into a di¤erent industry requires costly
7retraining, then there may be di¤erences in the value of searching across submarkets.
We denote these di¤erences by ￿WM
i , so that the worker mobility curve is given by
^ pi + ^ SW
i = ￿WM
i (2)
If unemployment bene…ts are the same across submarkets, the dispersion in ￿WM
i is a
measure of worker mobility costs. If the di¤erence in the value of searching in a particular
submarket i becomes to high compared to the average, it becomes worth for workers
to pay the mobility cost and move into that submarket. Unemployed workers moving
into market i makes it harder to …nd a job in that submarket, reducing ^ pi and therefore
￿WM
i . If unemployment bene…ts vary across submarkets, then di¤erences in the value






Having a vacancy looking for a worker in submarket i costs the …rm ki in terms of
vacancy posting costs. With probability qi, this vacancy gets …lled, in which case the
…rm gets surplus SJ
i from the match. Thus, the per-period value of searching for a
worker in submarket i is given by zJ
i = ￿ki + qiSJ
i .
If …rms can freely relocate vacancies across submarkets, it must be that the value of
searching for a worker is equalized across submarkets. Analogous to the worker mobility
curve, we get a job mobility curve, which states that jobs that are attractive to …rms
must be hard to …ll. If there are barriers to job mobility, these give rise to di¤erences
in the value of a vacancy across submarkets.











The relation between worker and job surplus is determined by assumptions on how
worker and …rm divide the total surplus from their match. The instrument that is
used to divide the surplus is the wage. In standard labor market models, a common
assumption is that wages are set by generalized Nash bargaining, which divides total
match surplus in …xed proportions between worker and …rm.
If the share of match surplus that goes to the worker ￿i, often referred to as the
worker’s bargaining power, is constant across submarkets, Nash bargaining over the
wage implies that worker and job surplus are proportional across submarkets, ^ SW
i = ^ SJ
i .
In general, wages may deviate from the Nash bargaining solution, for example because
8wages are not rebargained in each period. This is captured in the wage bargaining curve.
^ SW




i may re‡ect wage bargaining costs, preventing the wage to be rebar-
gained to the Nash bargaining solution, or other deviations from Nash bargaining, for





The …nal relation needed to close the model, between worker and job …nding rates,
is determined by assumptions on the matching technology. In the standard models,
matches are formed from unemployed workers and vacancies through a constant returns
to scale Cobb-Douglas matching function. Under this assumption, the worker and job
…nding rates are both iso-elastic functions of the vacancy-unemployment ratio ￿i, often
referred to as labor market tightness, qi = Bi￿
￿￿
i and pi = Bi￿
1￿￿
i , where ￿ is the
elasticity of unemployment in the matching function and Bi is matching e¢ciency. This
gives rise to the following curve, describing the matching process.
^ qi = ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
^ pi + ￿MF
i (5)
Dispersion in ￿MF
i re‡ects dispersion in matching e¢ciency across submarkets, ￿MF
i =
^ Bi
1￿￿. If the elasticity of the matching function is not constant across submarkets, then
the above relation still holds in …rst order approximation, and ￿MF
i re‡ects all di¤erences





1￿￿ (￿ p ￿ ￿ q) ^ ￿i.
2.2 Sources of Structural Unemployment
If there is perfect worker mobility, perfect job mobility, Nash bargaining with constant
bargaining power and a matching function with constant matching e¢ciency, then labor
market conditions are identical in all submarkets. To see this, combine equations (2),
(3), (4) and (5) to solve for the job …nding rate.













i = 0 gives ^ pi = 0 or pi = ￿ p for all i. Substituting
back into the various equations, it is straightforward to show that the worker …nding
rate, and worker and …rm surplus are equalized as well. In this case, the model reduces
to a standard labor market model, in which we can e¤ectively think of the labor market
as a single, unsegmented market. Unemployment in this case is entirely due to search
frictions.
9Deviations from any of these four relations generate dispersion in labor market tight-
ness and job …nding rates. There are four sources of dispersion across submarkets of the
labor market segments: ￿WM
i represents heterogeneity in unemployment bene…ts and
barriers to worker mobility, ￿JM
i heterogeneity in vacancy posting costs and barriers to
job mobility, ￿WB
i heterogeneity in wage bargaining power and wage rigidities, and ￿MF
i
heterogeneity in matching e¢ciency. All four sources lead to unemployed workers and
vacancies being in di¤erent submarkets and thus cause structural unemployment. For
example, if ￿WM
i > 0, too few unemployed workers are searching for jobs in submarket i,
either because unemployment bene…ts are relatively low there or because mobility costs
prevent more unemployed workers from moving into that submarket. If ￿WB
i > 0, too
many unemployed workers and too few vacancies are in submarket i, because wages are
higher than in comparable jobs in other submarkets so that workers reap a dispropor-
tionally large share of match surplus in this submarket.
Dispersion in labor market conditions generates unemployment because the job …nd-
ing rate is concave in labor market tightness. Therefore, the distribution of vacancies
and unemployed workers that results in the highest aggregate job …nding rate, keeping
…xed the total number of vacancies and unemployed …xed, is to equalize labor market
tightness over submarkets. To formalize this, consider a mean-preserving change in the
distribution of labor market tightness from ￿i to ￿0
i. The aggregate job …nding rate ￿ p0























where 0 < ￿ < 1 is the elasticity of unemployment in the matching function and ￿ ￿
is the aggregate separation rate. The unemployment rate follows from the aggregate
job …nding rate by assuming steady state, so that ￿ u =
￿ ￿
￿ ￿+￿ p. See appendix A.1 for the
derivation of equation (7). The aggregate job …nding rate is higher, ￿ p0 > ￿ p, and therefore
the unemployment rate lower, ￿ u0 < ￿ u, if and only if the dispersion in ^ p0
i is smaller than
the dispersion in ^ pi, in the sense that ￿i is a mean-preserving spread of ￿0
i (i.e. the
distribution of ￿0
i second-order stochastically dominates the distribution of ￿i).
Equations (6) and (7) allow us to decompose structural unemployment into its four
sources. The idea is that if we remove, for example, the worker mobility costs, setting
￿WM
i = 0, but leave the job mobility costs, wage bargaining costs and heterogeneity in
matching e¢ciency in place, then ￿JM
i , ￿WB
i and ￿MF
i would stay the same. Notice that
this is probably not a good assumption for the short run, because worker or job mobility
or wage rebargaining a¤ects equations (2), (3) and (4) simultaneously. In the long
run, however, after many shocks have hit the labor market, we would expect deviations
because of job mobility and wage bargaining costs or heterogeneity in matching e¢ciency
10to be similar to what they were. Thus, the question we can answer is what unemployment
rate would prevail in the long run, if we removed one or more deviations from the




i , we can use equation
(6) to calculate what the job …nding rates in each submarket would be if we set one or
more of the ￿’s equal to zero. Then, using equation (7), we can also calculate the
aggregate job …nding and unemployment rates under these scenarios. To estimate the
￿’s, we use equations (2), (3), (4) and (5) and data on the surpluses and …nding rates.
The next section describes how we obtain these data.
In the presence of worker or job mobility costs, wage bargaining costs and/or het-
erogeneity in matching e¢ciency, unemployment must be higher than if there is no
dispersion in labor market conditions. However, this does not imply that removing one
or more of these costs necessarily decreases unemployment. The reason is that the var-
ious costs may reinforce or counteract each other, so that removing some but not all of
these costs may increase unemployment.5 This result is intuitive. Imagine two otherwise
identical submarkets of the labor market, one with high wages and one with low wages.
Suppose these wage di¤erentials can exist because of wage bargaining costs, but that
labor market tightness is nevertheless equal in both submarkets, because mobility costs
prevent workers and jobs from moving from one submarket to the other. Now suppose
we removed the mobility costs but left the wage bargaining costs in place. Unemployed
workers would move to the submarket where wages are high, whereas vacancies would
move to the submarket where wages are low. The result would be a decrease in the
aggregate job …nding rate and an increase in structural unemployment. In the empirical
analysis in section 4, we will show that this is in fact a realistic mechanism.
3 Data and Measurement
To test the relations we derived in the previous section, we need empirical measures of
worker surplus SW
i , job surplus SJ
i , the job-…nding rate pi, and the worker-…nding rate
qi for submarkets of the labor market. In this section, we describe how we operationalize
these concepts empirically and describe the data sources we use to construct them. As
we need to make a good number of auxilliary assumptions in order to be able to do this,
we also describe how we explore the robustness of our results to these assumptions.
3.1 De…ning Submarkets
The …rst problem is how to empirically de…ne a submarket. A submarket of the labor
market is de…ned as a subset of unemployed workers or vacant jobs that are similar to
5Removing some costs may even decrease welfare in a second-best world. Our framework, however,
has little to say about welfare, and we restrict ourselves to statements about unemployment. For some
thoughts about welfare in a, much simpler, model with heterogeneous workers, see Merkl and van Rens
(2011).
11each other but di¤erent from other workers or jobs, so that each unemployed worker
and each …rm with a vacant job searches in one submarket only. In our theoretical
framework, we assumed that submarkets are mutually exclusive, so that two workers
that are searching for some of the same jobs are searching for all of the same jobs, and
if a worker is searching for a job, then that job is searching for that worker. In practice,
these assumptions are likely to be violated, unless we de…ne submarkets as very small
and homogeneous segments of the labor markets, based on geographic location as well
as the skill set required to do a job.
We use 50 US states to explore geographic mismatch and around 35 industries to
explore skill mismatch.6 This choice is driven by data limitations and follows other em-
pirical contributions in this literature (Sahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2010), Barni-
chon and Figura (2011)). Unfortunately, it is not possible to use very small submarkets,
because we would have too little data about each submarket. Shimer (2007a), for in-
stance, suggests using the interaction of 800 occupations and 922 geographic areas (362
MSAs plus 560 rural areas), which gives a total of 740;000 submarkets. In our dataset,
we have information on about 150;000 workers in a given year, so that we would have
1 datapoint for each 5 submarkets.
It is also not possible to use occupations, correctly de…ned by the skills required to
perform the tasks involved, because not all data we need for our analysis are available by
occupation and/or skill. Moreover, such skill-de…ned occupational groups would likely
to be overlapping across di¤erent workers. For example, an micro-theorist might look for
jobs in economics departments and business schools, whereas a …nancial economist would
look for jobs in private banks and business schools. We are working on an alternative
way to estimate mismatch and structural unemployment that would allow to use these
overlapping, skill-de…ned occupational groups, see Herz (2011b). This method would
not allow estimating structural unemployment due to barriers to job mobility or wage
bargaining costs, but may provide a more credible estimate for structural unemployment
due to worker mobility costs.
The choice of the submarkets, in particular the level of aggregation, will a¤ect the
level of structural unemployment. The fact that we …nd very little structural unem-
ployment due to barriers to geographic mobility, for instance, might change if we had
data on more detailed geographic locations. And the fact we …nd little mismatch across
industries does not imply there is no skill mismatch across skill-de…ned occupational
groups.
6Precisely, we have 37 industries based on the SIC classi…cation for the 1983-1997 period and 35
industries based on the NAICS classi…cation for the 2003-2009 period. For the 1998-2002 period, we do
not observe all necessary data by industry, because in these years the wage data from the CPS were still
based on the SIC, whereas the pro…t data from the NIPA were already based on the NAICS.
123.2 Measuring Match Surplus
We assumed that matches in submarket i are formed by combining an unemployed
worker and a vacant job, both of which were searching in submarket i. If we further
assume that when matches are destroyed, both worker and vacancy remain in submarket
i, at least initially, then the surplus of match in submarket i must satisfy the following
Bellman equation,
(1 + r)Sit = yit + (1 ￿ ￿it)EtSit+1 (8)
where Sit may be worker or …rm surplus, yit is the ‡ow payo¤ from the match (to worker
or …rm) and ￿it is turnover in submarket i.
We observe match payo¤s yit and turnover ￿it in our dataset. For the worker, payo¤s
yW
it equal wages minus unemployment bene…ts and the disutility from working, and
turnover equals the separation rate ￿it plus the job …nding rate, ￿W
it = ￿it + pit. For
the …rm, payo¤s from a …lled job yJ
it equal pro…ts gross of vacancy posting costs, and
turnover equals the separation rate plus the worker …nding rate, ￿J
it = ￿it + qit. We
use these data and equation (8) to calculate match surplus for the worker and …rm,
SW
it and SJ
it respectively. In the context of the standard search and matching model, it
is straightforward to derive equation (8) from the Bellman equations for workers and
…rms, see appendix A.2.
For our exercise, what matters is the dispersion in surplus across submarkets of the
labor markets. Dispersion in surplus is sensitive to the persistence in payo¤s and the
level of turnover. The persistence of payo¤s matters because match surplus equals the
expected net present value of all future payo¤s from the match. If payo¤s are very
persistent, then current payo¤ di¤erentials will persist into the future, thus generating
more dispersion in the expected net present value. The level of turnover matters because
it determines by how much future payo¤s are discounted. Notice that persistence in
turnover is less relevant. If turnover is currently high and converges back to a lower
level, then the expected net present value of payo¤s from the match will be in between
its values if turnover stays constant at its current high level or at its future lower level.
Therefore, we assume turnover is constant over the duration of the match, ￿it+s = ~ ￿it for
all s ￿ 0. In our baseline results, we assume that turnover stays constant at its current
level in the submarket, ~ ￿it = ￿it, but we explore the robustness of our results if turnover
equals average turnover in all submarkets, ~ ￿it = ￿ ￿t. These two assumptions capture the
extreme cases for turnover that maximize and minimize dispersion in surplus.
For payo¤s from matches in each submarket, we assume an autoregressive process
that reverts to the average payo¤ across all submarkets.
yit+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)yit + ￿￿ yt ) Etyit+s = ￿ yt + (1 ￿ ￿)
s (yit ￿ ￿ yt) (9)
By varying the parameter ￿, we explore the robustness of our results to the amount of
13persistence in match payo¤s. The …rst-order autocorrelation in wages is 0:92 per year in
the state-level data and 0:84 in the industry-level data. This is consistent with Blanchard
and Katz (1992), who …nd an autocorrelation of 0:94 across US states, and Alvarez and
Shimer (2011), who …nd 0:90 for 75 industries at the 3-digit level of disaggregation (CES
data, 1990-2008), and conclude that wages are nearly a random walk. Autocorrelation
in pro…ts is lower: 0:58 in the state-level data and 0:54 in the industry-level data. In
our baseline results, we assume wages and pro…ts are a random walk, ￿ = 0, but our
results are robust more mean-reversion.7
The assumptions that turnover is constant over the duration and payo¤s follow




r + ~ ￿it
+
yit ￿ ￿ yt
1 + r ￿ (1 ￿ ~ ￿it)(1 ￿ ￿)
'
￿ yt
r + ~ ￿it
+
yit ￿ ￿ yt
r + ~ ￿it + ￿
(10)
If match payo¤s follow a random walk, ￿ = 0, as in our baseline, then match surplus is
the annuity value of the current payo¤, Sit =
yit
r+￿it, evaluated at an e¤ective discount
rate which includes not only the rate of time preference, but also the turnover rate.
The higher the wage in a submarket, the higher is the surplus of having a job in that
submarket. The more likely it is to lose that job in the future – that is, the higher is
￿it and therefore ￿it – the lower is the surplus. Also, the easier it is for an unemployed
person in this market to …nd a job – the higher pit and therefore ￿it – the smaller is the
advantage of already having a job.
3.3 Measuring Job and Worker Finding Rates
In order to test whether the matching technology is the same across submarkets, using
equation (5), we need data on job and worker …nding rates by states and industries.
Data on job …nding rates are readily available from the Current Populations Survey, see
section 3.4. However, to calculate worker …nding rates, we would need …rm-level data,
which are available from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), but
only from the year 2000 onwards.
To obtain data on worker …nding rates for a longer sample period, we give up on
testing equation (5) and impose this equation holds with ￿MF
i = 0 for all i. Then, we use
this relation to construct data for worker …nding rates qi from data on job …nding rates
pi. In future work, we plan to explore the validity of this assumption, using (con…dential)
disaggregated JOLTS data for the recent years.
Because we cannot test the homogeneity of the matching technology, we can estimate
7Strictly speaking, what matters is not the persistence in average wages and pro…ts, but the per-
sistence of wages and pro…ts of a given match. However, as shown by Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens
(2008) and Kudlyak (2010), wages paid out over the duration of a match are more persistent than av-
erage wages, so if anything these estimates understate the autocorrelation in wages. The reason that
the persistence of payo¤s does not a¤ect the results very much, is that mean-reversion enters additively
with turnover, see equation (10), which is close to 1 at annual frequency.
14only three of the four potential sources of structural unemployment in equation (6). If
there is heterogeneity in the matching technology across submarkets, this will not a¤ect
our estimates of the level and cyclical behavior of structural unemployment. It will,
however, a¤ects our estimates of the sources of structural unemployment. It is not clear
what the direction of this bias would be. If, for example, states with high job …nding rates
tend to have higher matching e¢ciency, ￿MF
i > 0, we would tend to underestimate the
worker …nding rate in those states, see equation (5). This would then bias our estimates
of the job mobility costs, see equation (3). Whether we would over- or underestimate
these costs would depend on whether states with high job …nding rates tend to have
higher or lower than average pro…ts.
3.4 Data Sources
Our analysis requires data on wages wit net of unemployment bene…ts and the disutility
from working bit, pro…ts ￿it gross of vacancy posting costs kit, separation rates ￿it and
job …nding rates pit by states and industries. From these data, we can calculate worker
and job surplus and worker …nding rates as explained above.
Our primary data source is the Current Population Survey (CPS) administered by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). From the basic montly …les we construct job
…nding and separation rates. The variable labor force status indicates which workers
are unemployed and which are employed. The number of workers whose status changes
from unemployed to employed as a fraction of the total number of unemployed workers
in a submarket is the job …nding rate. The number of workers whose status changes
from employed to unemployed as a fraction of the total number of employed workers in a
submarket is the separation rate.8 To calculate job …nding rates by industry, we assign
unemployed workers to the industry where they last held a job, following the BLS. As
a robustness check, we also calculate …nding rates, assuming unemployed workers are
searching in the industry where they ultimately …nd a job, following Herz (2011a).
From the outgoing rotation groups, we get wages, calculated as usual weekly earnings
divided by usual weekly hours. We limit the sample to wage and salary workers between
16 and 65 years of age, with non-missing data for state and industry classi…cation. These
data are available at monthly frequency, which we aggregate to annual time series in
order to increase the number of observations, ending up with a sample of about 150;000
workers per year. We currently use data for the 1983-2009 period, although data are in
principle available from 1979 (we plan to update the results to include the earlier years
of data).
Data on pro…ts by state and industry come from the National Income and Product
8This is a common way to measure worker ‡ows, see Shimer (2007b). There are several reasons why
the level of worker ‡ows constructed in this way is biased, like measurement error (Abowd and Zellner
(1985)) and time aggregation bias. Since we use only worker ‡ows in deviations from the average worker
across submarkets, these biases should not a¤ect our results.
15Account (NIPA) data collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We use gross
operating surplus per employee as our measure of pro…ts. In addition, compensation
of employees provides an alternative measure of wages. Gross operating surplus and
compensation of employees add up to value added, net of taxes and subsidies. Thus, our
measure of pro…ts includes the return to investments in capital. We drop the industries
“Mining”, “Utilities”, “Real estate and rental and leasing” and “Petroleum and coal
products manufacturing” because reported pro…ts are extremely large in these industries.
We use nominal data on wages and pro…ts and do not use a price de‡ator in our
baseline estimates. The reason is that if we were to use an aggregate series for the
de‡ator, this would not a¤ect our results, which use only the cross-sectional variation
in the data. As a robustness check, we also show results for structural unemployment
due to geographic mismatch using a state-speci…c de‡ator provided by Berry, Fording,
and Hanson (2000), which is available until 2007.
Finally, we need to make assumptions on unemployment bene…ts (including the
utility from leisure) bit, vacancy posting costs kit, the discount rate r and the elasticity of
the matching function ￿. In our baseline results, we assume the replacement ratio bit=wit
equals 0:73, which is the value preferred by Hall (2009) and Nagypal and Mortensen
(2007). We explore the robustness of our results to setting the replacement ratio to
0:4 (as in Shimer (2005)) or 0:95 (as in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)), as well as to
allowing for the replacement ratio to vary across states according to the weekly bene…t
amounts published by the Department of Labor (2010). We assume ￿ = 0:6 in our
baseline results, again following Nagypal and Mortensen (2007), and explore robustness
to setting ￿ = 0:5 or ￿ = 0:7, the lower and upper bound of the plausible range of
estimates in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). We set the annual discount rate r = 0:04
and vacancy posting costs kit=￿it = 0:03, but these assumptions do not matter for the
results.
3.5 Controlling for Worker Heterogeneity
We estimate structural unemployment from the dispersion in wages, pro…ts and …nding
rates. It is crucial, therefore, that we control for heterogeneity. In the model, all
workers and jobs are the same, and all dispersion re‡ects worker or job mobility or
wage bargaining costs. In the real world, wages, pro…ts and even job …nding rates vary
across workers not only because of these adjustment costs, but also because workers have
di¤erent education, experience or other characteristics. For example, wages in Maine
may be higher than in Arkansas because the average education level is higher there.
Our approach to deal with worker heterogeneity in the data, is to calculate worker
and job surplus, and job …nding rates for homogeneous groups of workers, and then to
average ^ SW
i , ^ SJ
i and ^ pi, in relative deviations from the mean across submarkets, over all
groups of workers. We de…ne groups of homogeneous workers based on all observable
16worker characteristics in our dataset: education, experience, gender, race and marital
status.
We implement this approach in two steps. First, we regress the variable of interest on
observable worker characteristics using a ‡exible speci…cation. The variable of interest
is either the wage, or an dummy variable indicating whether a worker lost or found a
job. Second, we calculate …tted values for 40 worker cells, de…ned based on 2 gender,
5 education groups (less than high school, high school graduate, some college, college
graduate, or more than college), and 4 categories for potential labor market experience
(0-10 years, 11-20 years, 21-30 years, 31-40 years after completion of schooling), and
calculate worker and job surplus and job …nding rates for the average worker in each of
these 40 cells.
The reasons for the …rst step are threefold. First, it allows us to control for observable
characteristics, race and marital status, which are not used to de…ne worker cells because
doing so would result in too few observations per cell. When we calculate …tted values,
we set these variables equal to a reference category, e¤ectively calculating hypothetical
wages and worker ‡ows as if all workers were white, non-hispanic and married. Second,
the regression allows us to control for di¤erences in education and experience within
cells. Third, using …tted values makes sure that there are no missing values: if there
are no workers in a given cell, we generate a virtual worker with gender, education and
experience equal to the cell average. The speci…cation we use must be ‡exible enough
to not change the features of the data, but restrictive enough so that we can identify
…tted values for all cells. We includes fourth order polynomials in all controls, plus
interactions of the …rst order e¤ects of all controls with each other as well as with state
or industry dummies, see appendix A.3 for the exact speci…cation.
The second step controls for di¤erences in gender, education and experience across
cells in a fully non-parametric manner. Because we …rst take relative deviations from the
average across submarkets, and only then average over worker groups, any di¤erences in
dispersion because of di¤erences in the composition of the work force over the 40 cells
are controlled for.
Controlling for worker heterogeneity in pro…ts is more di¢cult, because we do not
observe pro…ts at the worker level. We attempt to still control for heterogeneity, by as-
suming that worker heterogeneity a¤ects pro…ts in the same way it a¤ects wages. Then,
we can control for heterogeneity by multiplying pro…ts by the ratio of wages controlled for
worker heterogeneity w￿









it . We explore the robustness of our results
if we do not control pro…ts and wages for worker heterogeneity.
173.6 Controlling for Compensating Di¤erentials
There are other di¤erences between jobs than just the wage (and separation rate). In
particular, residual wage di¤erentials have been interpreted as compensating di¤eren-
tials: non-monetary job amenities like ‡exible hours or safe working conditions, in return
for which workers are willing to accept lower wages, see Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982).
Since we want to interpret wage di¤erentials as evidence for worker or job mobility costs
or wage bargaining frictions, we need to control for compensating di¤erentials.
Unfortunately, we do not observe the characteristics of jobs, unlike those of workers.
Therefore, we assume job amenities are constant over time, so the the true worker surplus
is given by ^ SW
it + cW
i and the true job surplus equals ^ SJ
it + cJ
i . Then, we can control for
compensating di¤erentials by using ^ SW
it , ^ SJ
it, ^ pit and ^ qit in deviations from their time
series averages. To see how this works, note that equations (2), (3) and (4) hold in each
year, so that,
^ pit + ^ SW
it + cW
i = ￿WM
it ) b ^ pit + b ^ S
W
it = ^ ￿WM
it (11)
^ qit + ^ SJ
it + cJ
i = ￿JM
it ) b ^ qit + b ^ S
J




i ￿ ^ SJ
it ￿ cJ
i = ￿WB
it ) b ^ S
W
it ￿ b ^ S
J
it = ^ ￿WB
it (13)
where b ^ xit denotes a variable in deviation from its time series average, where the variable
itself is in deviation from its average across submarkets, b ^ xit = ^ xit ￿ ^ xi and ^ xit = xit ￿ ￿ xt
and ^ ￿it = ￿it ￿ ￿ ￿i denotes the adjustment costs in deviations from their time series av-
erage. Taking deviations from the time series averages is like including state or industry-
speci…c …xed e¤ects and controls for time-invariant compensating di¤erentials.




it , but only the deviations from their time series averages.
As a result, equations (6) and (7) no longer give the correct level of the aggregate
job …nding rate and unemployment due to structural factors. However, this is not
a problem. First of all, the level of structural unemployment strongly depends on the
level of disaggregation of submarkets, so that we would not want to interpret the level in
any case. Second, the change in the level of structural unemployment due to controlling
for …xed e¤ects is small in practice, at least for mismatch across states. The reason is
that worker mobility, job mobility and wage bargaining costs are likely to be small in
the long run. Therefore, ￿ ￿WM
i = ￿ ￿JM
i = ￿ ￿WB
i = 0, which implies ^ pi = 0, so that b ^ pit is
close to ^ pit.
184 Results
We start the description of our results by exploring how well equations (2), (3) and
(4) hold in the data, and presenting estimates of the adjustment costs that lead to
deviations from these equations. In section 4.2, we present our estimates for structural
unemployment and explore its cyclical behavior. Finally, in section 4.3, we use equations
(6) and (7) to decompose structural unemployment into the contribution each of the
adjustment costs across labor market segments.
4.1 Mobility and Wage Bargaining Costs
Figure 2 shows scatterplots for states around the worker mobility, job mobility and wage
bargaining curves. These graphs use data for the year 2005, but look very similar for
other years. The relation between job …nding rates and worker surpluses and the relation
between worker …nding rates and job surpluses across states are roughly consistent with
the worker mobility curve (2) and the job mobility curve (3) in our model, which have
a slope of minus one. The dotted regression line shows that the slope of these relations
is around minus one in the data. The relation between worker and job surplus, on the
other hand, is very di¤erent from what the wage bargaining curve (4) in our model
would predict.
There is no reason to expect the data to be consistent with the correlations implied
by the worker mobility, job mobility and wage bargaining curves. These curves repre-
sent partial equilibrium relationships, and the only allocation that is consistent with all
three curves, is full equalization of surpluses and …nding rates across states. It seems
that the relation between job …nding rates and worker surpluses and the relation between
worker …nding rates and job surpluses are largely governed by arbitraging through mo-
bility of workers and jobs respectively. However, wage bargaining power seems to vary
substantially across states.
Nash bargaining over wages, as in equation (4), prescribes that workers and …rms
share the surplus from a match in …xed proportions, so that matches that are relatively
attractive to …rms are relatively attractive to workers as well. If total match surplus
varies across states, for example because labor productivity is di¤erent in di¤erent states,
this maps out the wage bargaining curve. In reality, it seems that di¤erences in wages
across states are much larger than di¤erences in labor productivity. Since matches with
high wages generate high surplus for workers, but low surplus for …rms, these di¤erences
generate downward rather than upward sloping relation between worker and job surplus.
As a result, we observe deviations from the wage bargaining curve that are much larger
than deviations from the worker mobility and job mobility curves, suggesting that wage
bargaining costs are more important as a source of structural unemployment than worker
or job mobility costs.
19Figure 3 and shows similar results for mismatch across industries. These plots for
industries look very similar to those for states, although the dispersion around the curves
is roughly twice as large. As for states, we …nd that the job and mobility curves are
roughly as in the model, whereas there is substantial heterogeneity in wage bargaining
across industries.
If our interpretation of deviations from the curves as adjustment costs is correct, then
we would expect states or industries that are ‘close’ to each would on average be more
similar in terms of deviations from the worker mobility, job mobility and wage bargaining
curves, since the cost of arbitraging away di¤erences would be smaller between these
states. Table 1 reports the 5 pairs of states with the largest and 5 pairs with the smallest









their physical distance. It is clear from the table, that the distance between states that
are more similar to each other in terms of the value of searching for a job is on average
much shorter. Notice that the relation is not monotonic, but we also did not expect it
to be, because even if costs of arbitrage are very high, states may have similar labor
market conditions because they were subject to similar shocks. Table 2 reports similar
results for industries. These results are harder to interpret because it is not clear what
measure to use for distance between industries. We are working on a distance measure
based on the skill requirements of di¤erent occupations, see Herz (2011b).
Dispersion of states and industries around the worker mobility, job mobility and
wage bargaining curves is a measure of the size of the costs of arbitrage in each of these
relations. As a summary statistic for dispersion, we use the standard deviation, repre-
sented by the dashed lines in Figures 2 and 3. The units of this measure of adjustment
costs are intuitive. Since worker and …rm surplus are measured in relative deviations
from their cross-sectional average, their standard deviation represents the typical devi-
ation relative to the cross-sectional average. For example, a standard deviation of 0:2
means that a typical state or industry has a surplus that is up to 20% higher or lower
than the average across states/industries.
Table 3 summarizes our estimates of the worker and job mobility costs and wage
bargaining costs. This table uses pooled data for all years over the 1983-2009 sample
period in order to get more precise estimates of the standard deviations. All of the
adjustment costs are high, ranging from 15% for moving workers across states to 61%
for adjusting wages across industries. Mobility costs for workers and jobs are roughly
similar, whereas wage bargaining costs are about twice as high. Adjustment costs across
industries are roughly twice as high as across states. Of course these estimates are sensi-
tive to the level of disaggregation. According to our estimates, retraining a worker who
is currently employed in the telecommunications industry to work in machine manufac-
turing is about twice as costly as moving that worker from Wyoming to Massachussets
or New York.
20If we do not control for compensating di¤erentials, see Section 3.6, we …nd estimates
for the adjustment costs across states that are roughly double and for costs across indus-
tries that are roughly triple our baseline estimates. The relative importance of the three
adjustment costs, however, does not change very much whether or not we remove state
and industry-speci…c …xed e¤ects. The estimates are robust to reasonable variations
in the elasticity of the matching function ￿. If we assume a higher replacement ratio,
bit=wit, worker mobility costs become more, and wage bargaining costs less important.
However, even for an implausibly high replacement ratio of 0:95, wage bargaining costs
are still as high as worker mobility costs and twice as high as job mobility costs. As-
suming a lower replacement ratio a¤ects the estimates very little. The assumption we
make on turnover rates seems to be somewhat important for the results. If we assume
turnover is constant across states and industries, then adjustment costs across industries
decrease to the same level as adjustment costs across states, and both across states and
across industries wage bargaining costs become less important than job mobility costs.
4.2 Cyclicality of Structural Unemployment
Worker and job mobility costs and particularly wage bargaining costs are high. These
adjustment costs generate dispersion in job …nding rates across states and industries,
which leads to structural unemployment. We now turn to the question how much of
unemployment is due to these structural factors, and whether the cyclical behavior
(volatility, persistence) of structural unemployment is di¤erent from that of unemploy-
ment caused by search frictions or other factors.
Figure 4 plots the overall steady state unemployment rate in the US over the 1983-
2009 period, as well as the counterfactual steady state unemployment rates if there were
no mismatch across states or industries.9 The counterfactuals are constructed using
equations (6) and (7) to calculate the counterfactual job …nding rate that would prevail




i = 0 for all i. In order to correct for compensating di¤erentials,
we calculated dispersion in job …nding rates after subtracting the time series average
of the job …nding rate in each state and industry. Therefore, we should refrain from
interpreting the average distance of the counterfactuals from the actual unemployment
rate. However, we can analyze the change in the distance between the two between
recessions and booms. The contribution of mismatch, both across states and across
industries, to ‡uctuations unemployment is tiny. If we do not control for compensating
di¤erentials, the contribution of mismatch across industries is slightly larger, but still
very small as a fraction of movements in the total unemployment rate.
9In this graph, as well as in all other graphs in the paper, the ‘overall’ or ‘total’ unemployment rate
is the steady state unemployment rate corresponding to the average …nding and separation rates across
states or industries. This steady state unemployment rate, which is comparable to our estimates for
structural unemployment, is very close to the actual unemployment rate.
21Figure 5 shows the di¤erence between the actual unemployment rate and the counter-
factual unemployment rate if there were no dispersion in job …nding rates across states.
This di¤erence can be interpreted as structural unemployment due to geographic mis-
match. The dotted line in the …gure shows the actual unemployment rate, plotted on
a di¤erent scale on the right-hand axis, in order to compare the ‡uctuations in the two
series. This graph allows us to answer the question whether structural unemployment
due to mismatch across states is less cyclical and more persistent than unemployment
due to other factors, as suggested by Kocherlakota (2010). It also allows us to compare
the Great Recession to previous recession episodes.
Structural unemployment closely follows the business cycles in total unemployment.
At the beginning of the sample, structural unemployment is high but declining com-
ing out of the 1982 recession. Structural unemployment increases again in the 1991
recession and more so in the Great Recession, starting at the end of 2007. The rela-
tive amplitude of these ‡uctuations is similar to those in the total unemployment rate,
with the exception of the 2001 recession, when the overall unemployment rate moder-
ately increased, but structural unemployment almost did not change at all. There is no
evidence that structural unemployment due to geographic mismatch is more persistent
than the overall unemployment rate. Nor is there any indication that the increase in un-
employment in the Great Recession was more than in other recessions due to structural
factors. Although the level is di¤erent, the cyclical pattern in structural unemployment
due to geographic mismatch is very similar whether or not we control for compensating
di¤erentials.10
Figure 6 shows similar results for structural unemployment due to mismatch across
industries. Again ‡uctuations in structural unemployment look very similar to ‡uctua-
tions in the overall unemployment rate. If anything, the similarity is even more striking
that for structural unemployment due to mismatch across states, because structural un-
employment due to mismatch across industries is higher in all recessions in our sample
period, including the 2001 recession.
Concluding, we …nd that ‡uctuations in structural unemployment, due to geographic
mismatch as well as mismatch across industries, are small compared to ‡uctuations in
the overall unemployment rate, and exhibit very similar patterns. The …nding that
structural unemployment is a small part of total unemployment depends heavily of the
level of disaggregation of the submarkets and should not be over-interpreted. However,
the …nding that the cyclical behavior of structural unemployment is very similar to that
of the overall unemployment rate casts serious doubts on Kocherlakota’s claim that
stabilization policy is not e¤ective against structural unemployment.
How can the …nding that the contribution of structural unemployment to total un-
employment is small be reconciled with the …nding in section 4.1 that adjustment costs
10Several other choices, which we mentioned as robustness checks in Table 3, a¤ect the decomposition
of structural unemployment but not its overall level, and are therefore not relevant for this graph.
22are very large, particularly for wages. There are two reasons. First, large dispersion
in job …nding rates translates into an only modestly lower average job …nding rate be-
cause the concavity of job …nding rates in labor market tightness is not very strong.
To illustrate this, we consider equation (7) for the aggregate job …nding rate and make
distributional assumptions that allow us to evaluate the expectation operator in that
equation, see appendix A.4. Table 4 shows the results for this exercise. Given our esti-
mates for ￿ of around 0:3 for worker and job mobility costs across industries, see Table
3, and assuming ￿ = 0:6, we would expect mismatch to contribute at most 6 to 12%
to the overall unemployment rate. The second reason why high adjustment costs do
not translate into a lot of unemployment, and the reason that the actual contribution
is even smaller than what we would expect based on our estimates of the adjustment
costs, is that the various costs partially o¤set each other. The next subsection looks at
this e¤ect.
4.3 Sources of Structural Unemployment
Our approach, in particular equations (6) and (7), allows us not only to estimate the total
contribution of structural factors to unemployment, but also to decompose structural
unemployment into its sources. In particular, we can assess the contribution of barriers
to worker mobility, barriers to job mobility and wage bargaining costs. From the results
in section 4.1, we know that wage bargaining costs are large compared to worker and job
mobility costs. It seem reasonable to expect, therefore, that these costs also contribute
most to structural unemployment.
Figure 7 shows the evolution of structural unemployment due to mismatch across
states, and its three sources. As expected, structural unemployment due to wage bar-
gaining costs alone closely tracks total structural unemployment, re‡ecting the fact that
wage bargaining costs seem to be the most important impediment to equalization of job
…nding rates across states. The contribution of worker and job mobility costs is small
and largely acyclical, with the exception of the Great Recession, when the contribution
of worker mobility costs to structural unemployment is about as large as that of wage
bargaining costs. Removing mobility costs, while leaving wage bargaining costs in place,
would reduce unemployment very little, and in the period 1986-1988 would even have
increased the unemployment rate.
How can the unemployment rate increase when we remove one of the adjustment
costs across submarkets? The answer is related to the correlations between the devi-
ations from the worker mobility curve (2), the job mobility curve (3) and the wage
bargaining curve (4), which are given in Figure 8. States with high worker surplus and
low job surplus because of relatively high worker bargaining power, i.e. states with high
￿WB
i , tend to attract unemployed workers and loose jobs, resulting in a lower than aver-
age job …nding rate and higher than average worker …nding rate in that state, everything
23else equal. However, the same states tend to have low ￿WM
i and ￿JM
i , meaning worker
and job mobility costs tend to keep more unemployed workers and vacancies in the state
than we would expect based on worker and job surplus there. The worker mobility costs
reduce job …nding rates, reinforcing the e¤ect of the wage bargaining costs, but the job
mobility costs reduce worker …nding rates as well, partially o¤setting the e¤ect of the
wage bargaining costs.
Figures 9 and 10 show similar results for the decomposition of structural unem-
ployment due to mismatch across industries. The decomposition of structural unem-
ployment due to mismatch across industries in Figure 9 is noisier than its equivalent
for states. Nevertheless it is clear that wage bargaining costs explain most of the in-
crease in mismatch across industries in the 1991 and 2007 recessions. Across industries,
the correlations between the various adjustment costs are more pronounced than across
states, see Figure 10. Moreover, across industries, both worker and job mobility costs
counteract the e¤ect of wage bargaining costs. This explain why, although adjustment
costs are substantially higher across industries than across states, the contribution of
mismatch across industries to structural unemployment is smaller than the contribution
of mismatch across states.
Two clear conclusions emerge regarding the sources of structural unemployment.
First, wage bargaining costs are not only larger than worker and job mobility costs, but
they also contribute more to structural unemployment. Second, the various sources of
structural unemployment may reinforce as well as o¤set each other, particularly across
industries. These conclusions are interesting in terms of their policy implication. The
e¤ects on the unemployment rate of a policy that reduces worker mobility costs, for
example relocation or retraining subsidies to unemployed workers, are likely to be small
or even negative.
5 Conclusions
Structural unemployment is unemployment due to dispersion in job …nding rates across
submarkets of the labor market, which results in mismatch in the distribution of va-
cancies and unemployed workers over submarkets. We proposed a simple model of a
segmented labor market that allows us to think about the sources of structural unem-
ployment: worker and job mobility costs, frictions in the wage bargaining process and
heterogeneity in the matching technology across submarkets. Using data on wages and
…nding rates from the CPS and on pro…ts from the NIPA, we constructed measures of
the …rst three of these sources of mismatch across US states and industries
We …nd that adjustment costs are high across states and even higher across indus-
tries. Wage bargaining costs are larger than worker and job mobility costs and are
responsible for most of structural unemployment. However, because of limited con-
24cavity in the job …nding rate and because worker and job mobility costs partly o¤set
the e¤ect of wage bargaining costs, ‡uctuations in structural unemployment are small
compared to the overall unemployment rate. This is true for structural unemployment
due to mismatch across states, and even more so for mismatch across industries. More-
over, structural unemployment is equally cyclical and no more persistent than overall
unemployment, suggesting there may be no conceptual di¤erence between structural
and frictional unemployment. Reducing some but not all of the sources of structural
unemployment is likely to have little e¤ect, and may even increase the unemployment
rate.
A number of caveats are in order. First, the level of disaggregation is crucial for
our results. If we were to use more disaggregated submarkets, either by considering
smaller geographic areas and more detailed industry classi…cations, or by interacting
geographic areas with industries, the part of unemployment ‡uctuations that is due to
structural factors would increase by construction. Second, rather than industries, one
would probably want to de…ne submarkets based on skill-de…ned occupational groups.
We are trying to do this in a di¤erent paper, see Herz (2011b). Third, the …nding that
‡uctuations in structural unemployment are small does not mean the welfare e¤ects are
small, and even though reducing adjustment costs reduces unemployment by little, it
may improve welfare substantially. In related work, we are trying to evaluate the welfare
costs of unemployment in a model with heterogeneous workers, see Merkl and van Rens
(2011).
A Appendices
A.1 Derivation of equation (7) for the aggregate job …nding rate
Since we are considering a mean-preserving change in the distribution of labor market
tightness, we know that ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿0. Then, with pi = B￿
1￿￿
i , ￿i = (pi=B)
1
1￿￿, we get














= ￿ ￿0 (14)
Substituting ^ pi = (pi ￿ ￿ p)=￿ p , pi = ￿ p(1 + ^ pi) and re-arranging gives equation (7) in
the main text.
A.2 Worker and Firm surplus
The value of an employed worker in submarket i, Wit, and the value of an unemployed
worker in that submarket, UW
it , satisfy the following set of Bellman equations,
(1 + r)Wit = wit + ￿itEtUW
it+1 + (1 ￿ ￿it)EtWit+1 (15)
25(1 + r)UW
it = bit + pitEtWit+1 + (1 ￿ pit)EtUW
it+1 (16)
where ￿it is the separation rate, pit is the job …nding rate, wit is the wage and bit is the
‡ow value of being unemployed, which consists of unemployment bene…ts and the value
of leisure. Worker surplus equals the di¤erence between the payo¤ from having a job in
submarket i minus the payo¤ of looking for a job in that submarket, SW




it = wit ￿ bit + (1 ￿ ￿it ￿ pit)EtSW
it+1 (17)
where wit￿bit is the worker’s ‡ow payo¤ from having a job net of the payo¤ from being
unemployed, and ￿it + pit is worker turnover.
The value of a …lled job in submarket i, Jit, and the value of a vacancy in that
submarket, UJ
it, satisfy the following set of Bellman equations,
(1 + r)Jit = ￿it + ￿itEtUJ
it+1 + (1 ￿ ￿it)EtJit+1 (18)
(1 + r)UJ
it = ￿kit + qitEtJit+1 + (1 ￿ qit)EtUJ
it+1 (19)
where qit is the worker …nding rate, ￿it are ‡ow pro…ts and kit are vacancy posting
costs. Job surplus equals the di¤erence between the payo¤ from having a …lled job in
submarket i minus the payo¤ of having a vacancy in that submarket, SJ




it = ￿it + kit + (1 ￿ ￿it ￿ qit)EtSJ
it+1 (20)
where ￿it +kit is the …rm’s ‡ow payo¤ from having a …lled job gross of vacancy posting
costs, and ￿it + qit is job turnover.
A.3 Worker Heterogeneity
The speci…cation to control for observable worker heterogeneity must be ‡exible enough
to not change the features of the data across 40 cells based on gender (2 categories),
education (5 categories) and potential labor market experience (4 categories), but re-
strictive enough so that we can identify …tted values for all cells. We use the following
speci…cation for worker w in state or industry i,
ywi = D0








+ ￿12fwi ￿ swi + ￿13fwi ￿ s2
wi + ￿14fwi ￿ xwi + ￿15fwi ￿ x2
wi
+ swi ￿ D0
i￿16 + xwi ￿ D0
i￿17 + xwi ￿ S0
wi￿18 + x2
wi ￿ S0
wi￿19 + "wi (21)
where Di is a vector of dummies for states or industries, fwi is a dummy variable for
female workers, bwi a dummy for African American workers, mwi a dummy for married
26workers, swi is schooling in years, xwi is potential labor market experience (age minus
schooling minus 6) and Swi is a vector of dummies for the …ve education categories.
The dependent variable ywit is either the logarithm of the wage or a dummy variable
indicating whether that worker lost or found a job. If ywit is a dummy variable, we
use a probit model to guarantee that the …tted values lie between 0 and 1. For wages
we use a log-linear speci…cation, as is common in the literature, see Card (1999). In
order to get …tted values for wages, we use the …tted values for log wages and apply the
correction factor suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2010, p.108). For the regressions of
the probability to …nd or loose a job we use the sample weights from the basic monthly
…les. For regressions of wages we use the earnings weights, because wages are only
available in the outgoing rotation groups.
A.4 E¤ect dispersion on unemployment













Additional assumptions are needed to evaluate the expectation operator.


































Alternatively, taking a second order approximation around the cross-sectional mean











where in both expressions ￿ is the standard deviation of ^ pi. Notice a few (fairly obvious)
special cases: ￿ = 0 implies the …nding rate is linear in ￿i so that dispersion does not
matter and ￿ p0 = ￿ p for all ￿. If ￿ = 0 there is no dispersion in …nding rates and ￿ p0 = ￿ p
for all ￿.
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30Table 1
Di¤erences in labor market conditions between US states






￿ ￿ distance (miles)
Wyoming Alaska 0:86 2297
Wyoming Massachusetts 0:61 1798
Wyoming New York 0:61 1565
Alaska Florida 0:59 3840
Wyoming Kansas 0:57 552
Average distance 2010







South Dakota DC 0:0001 1239
North Dakota Ohio 0:0005 994
Louisiana Kentucky 0:0005 589
New Mexico Indiana 0:0011 1138
North Dakota Utah 0:0011 797
Average distance 952
State pairs with the largest and smallest di¤erences in the value of looking for work and
their distance in kilometers. Data for year 2005.
31Table 2
Di¤erences in labor market conditions between industries







Broadcasting and telecom Machinery manufacturing 1:07
Broadcasting and telecom Chemical manufacturing 1:03
Broadcasting and telecom Publishing (except internet) 0:99
Broadcasting and telecom Furniture and …xtures manufacturing 0:97
Broadcasting and telecom Textile, apparel, and leather manuf. 0:90









Transportation and warehousing Motion picture and sound recording 0.00017
Wholesale trade Nonmetallic mineral product manuf. 0.0008
Accommodation Computer and electronic product manuf. 0.00116
Retail trade Food services and drinking places 0.00133
Miscellaneous manufacturing Arts, entertainment, and recreation 0.00138
Industry pairs with the largest and smallest di¤erences in the value of looking for work.
Data for year 2005.
32Table 3
Worker mobility, job mobility and wage bargaining costs
across states across industries
WM costs JM costs WB costs WM costs JM costs WB costs
baseline 0:15 0:18 0:33 0:31 0:29 0:61
no comp di¤ 0:35 0:29 0:53 0:98 0:92 1:41
￿ = 0:5 0:15 0:16 0:26 0:30 0:26 0:55
￿ = 0:7 0:17 0:21 0:46 0:33 0:36 0:70
bit=wit = 0:4 0:10 0:18 0:34 0:21 0:29 0:55
bit=wit = 0:95 0:69 0:18 0:60 1:83 0:29 1:85
~ ￿it = ￿ ￿t 0:21 0:28 0:14 0:17 0:30 0:27
Pooled data for the 1983-2009 sample, by US states and industries. The measure of
adjustment costs is the median absolute deviation from the worker mobility, job mobility
and wage bargaining curves as in equations (2), (3) and (4).
33Table 4
E¤ect dispersion in labor market conditions on unemployment
Uniform approximation
￿
0:01 0:1 0:2 0:3 0:4 0:5
0 1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00
0:5 1:00 1:00 1:02 1:04 1:08 1:12
￿ 0:6 1:00 1:01 1:03 1:06 1:11 1:16
0:7 1:00 1:01 1:04 1:09 1:16 1:23
0:9 1:00 1:04 1:13 1:24 1:36 1:48
Second-order approximation
￿
0 0:1 0:2 0:3 0:4 0:5
0 1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00
0:5 1:00 1:01 1:04 1:09 1:15 1:22
￿ 0:6 1:00 1:01 1:06 1:12 1:21 1:30
0:7 1:00 1:02 1:08 1:17 1:27 1:38
0:9 1:00 1:07 1:16 1:25 1:31 1:37
Ratio of counterfactual job …nding rate without structural unemployment to actual job
…nding rate, ￿ p0=￿ p, as in equation (7). For calculations see appendix A.4
34Figure 1
Four sources of structural unemployment
35Figure 2
Worker mobility, job mobility and wage bargaining curves across US states
Worker mobility curve Wage bargaining curve
Job mobility curve
Dashed lines are one standard deviation away from the curve. Dotted lines represent
regression lines. Data for year 2005.
36Figure 3
Worker mobility, job mobility and wage bargaining curves across industries
Worker mobility curve Wage bargaining curve
Job mobility curve
Dashed lines are one standard deviation away from the curve. Dotted lines represent
regression lines. Data for year 2005.
37Figure 4
Structural unemployment due to mismatch across US states and industries
Contribution mismatch across US states to unemployment
Contribution mismatch across industries to unemployment
The dashed line is the actual unemployment rate. The solid lines are counterfactual
unemployment rates in the absence of dispersion in job …nding rates. The labelled “no
comp di¤” is estimated without controlling for compensating di¤erentials.
38Figure 5
Cyclicality of structural unemployment across US states
Structural unemployment due to mismatch across US states, calculated as actual un-
employment minus the counterfactual unemployment rate in the absence of dispersion
in job …nding rates across states. The line labelled “no comp di¤” shows structural
unemployment without controlling for compensating di¤erentials.
39Figure 6
Cyclicality of structural unemployment across industries
Structural unemployment due to mismatch across industries, calculated as actual un-
employment minus the counterfactual unemployment rate in the absence of dispersion
in job …nding rates across industries. The line labelled “no comp di¤” shows structural
unemployment without controlling for compensating di¤erentials.
40Figure 7
Sources of structural unemployment across US states
The solid line is our baseline estimate for structural unemployment, calculated as actual
unemployment minus the counterfactual unemployment rate in the absence of dispersion
in job …nding rates across states. The other lines show the contribution of worker
mobility costs (WM), job mobility costs (JM) and wage bargaining costs (WB).
41Figure 8
Adjustment costs across US states may reinforce of o¤set each other
Interactions between worker mobility costs, job mobility costs and wage bargaining costs
across states. Pooled data for 1983-2009.
42Figure 9
Sources of structural unemployment across industries
The solid line is our baseline estimate for structural unemployment, calculated as actual
unemployment minus the counterfactual unemployment rate in the absence of dispersion
in job …nding rates across industries. The other lines show the contribution of worker
mobility costs (WM), job mobility costs (JM) and wage bargaining costs (WB).
43Figure 10
Adjustment costs across industries may reinforce of o¤set each other
Interactions between worker mobility costs, job mobility costs and wage bargaining costs
across industries. Pooled data for 1983-2009.
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